ABSTRACT As one of the indispensable techniques of the future cellular network, Device-to-Device communications can be potentially exploited to alleviate the traffic load by distributing data for base station. In order to stimulate users to cooperate, a price-based power allocation scheme is proposed in this paper, in which the requester pays the cost of power provided by the cooperative user for data forwarding combined with the social tie. Particularly, since the requester and cooperative user pursue the rate enhancement and reward maximization, respectively, the utility of these two sides is quantified according to the power cost and constraint. By introducing a two-stage Stackelberg game, the final price and power allocation strategy are determined via a dynamic bidding process while approaching the optimal utility of the requester and cooperative user. Simulation results show that the studied power allocation scheme can effectively stimulate the user to forward data and improve the system performance.
subjectivity [23] [24] [25] . Generally speaking, users are selfish in a certain extent, resulting in a negative impact on the communication performance. In particular, for the cooperative communication scenario, if one user forwards data for another one, its own resources, such as power and battery energy, will be consumed inevitably. Hence, users' selfishness hinders the users from cooperating with others [26] [27] [28] . For the issue of data forwarding, most existing work either assumes that users are completely altruistic so that they are willing to transmit messages to anyone [37] , or assume that users are absolutely selfish so that they need to be incentivized with reward to participate in the process of data dissemination [39] . In fact, selfishness can be categorized into two types, one is personal selfishness, the other is social selfishness. For the user with personal selfishness, they are not willing to contribute their resource without benefit motivation. While users with social selfishness show different levels of selfishness, and the level is affected by the trust degree and social tie between users, which reveals the double-faced characteristic of users and is practical in the actual network. Obviously, a reasonable incentive mechanism is necessary for the data forwarding in the cooperative communication.
Inspired by the above analysis, a price-based power allocation scheme is proposed in this paper with a limitation on the total allocated power of the cooperative user, which consists of a BS, a cooperative user (i.e., leader) as data distributer and some requesting users as buyers. The cooperative user receives data from BS and then forwards it to the other requesters via D2D communication. In order to drive the participation of the cooperative user in the data forwarding, a Stackelberg game model is employed to maximize the benefits of both sides and motivate the cooperative users to distribute data for the BS. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Since social tie plays a key role in the data forwarding with respect to the social selfishness of users, the socialphysical abstract model is established to characterize the interplay between the social and physical domains.
• In view of the fact that the requesters pursue the rate enhancement and the cooperative user is interested in the power reward, the utility function of these two parties is created respectively with consideration of the social tie strength, power cost and minimum QoS requirement.
• Considering the benefit conflict between the cooperative user and requesters, a priced-based Stackelberg game model is employed under power constraint at cooperative user side, which converges to an equilibrium point while maximizing the utility of game players. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines related work. The system model is established in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the social tie based power allocation scheme, and Stackelberg game model is employed to dynamically price for the power resource. Simulation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Due to numerous advantages of D2D communication, it is widely used in the cooperative communication, so that cell-edge or deeply faded users can obtain a better connective experience. In this scenario, some specific users download data from BS and then forward to the destinations with inferior channel conditions [29] [30] [31] [32] ,improving network coverage and throughput. However, energy consumption is an inevitable issue during the cooperative communication because of the limited battery capacity of handled equipment.
There are mainly two ways to deal with the energy problem for wireless terminals with finite battery capacity, i.e., energy saving and energy harvesting. In order to optimize the achievable rates for the D2D users, [33] and [34] proposed a novel D2D communication scheme that allows D2D links to underlay cellular downlink by assigning D2D transmitters as full-duplex and half-duplex relays respectively to assist cellular downlink transmission. Meanwhile, the system target is accomplished via optimizing the transmission power at the base station (BS) and the D2D transmitter. Cao et al. [35] presented the combination of opportunistic mode selection and transmit power adaption for maximizing instantaneous and average spectral efficiency in relay-aided communication. Reference [36] investigated the energy-efficient transmission for D2D-enable cooperative networks aiming to maximize the investigated the energy-efficient transmission for D2D-enable cooperative networks aiming to maximize the energy-efficiency (EE) of the uplink transmission while guaranteeing the minimum data rate requirement via joint D2D relay node (DRN) placement and power allocation. Jiang et al. [37] proposed a new cognitive wireless network model through jointly user D2D and full-duplex relay (FDR), in which the D2D link rate is optimized for improving the secondary network throughput by the transmission power allocation of the secondary transmitter and FDR node.
However, most work assumed that all users are completely cooperative. In fact, rational users can be either cooperative or selfish and they tend to be selfish when the available resources are limited. A selfish user only focuses on its own benefit and is unwilling to carry and forward data for other users. Therefore, reasonable incentive mechanisms are necessary to motivate users' cooperation and attract more users to participate in data dissemination.
In [38] , a credit-based incentive scheme was proposed to stimulate the user cooperation, and credits were the stimulus to encourage users to forward data. Furthermore, each node ability to fetch messages of a specific kind of interest were evaluated and every single user can rent other nodes to help with obtaining the interest messages by paying credits. Reference [39] developed a self-interest-driven (SID) scheme to simulate cooperation among selfish users. As a key innovation of SID, virtual checks were introduced to eliminate the needs of accurate knowledge about whom and how many credits provider should pay. Reference [40] presented a novel incentive mechanism for opportunistic networks, which used pre-existing social-network information to detect and punish selfish users for incentivizing them to participate in the network. Simulation results demonstrated that this mechanism outperforms the existing schemes, and the social network information can also be used to improve existing incentive mechanisms.
Obviously, the above-mentioned incentive schemes assume that users are totally selfish, which is irrational in an actual network, since social tie plays a key role in the data transmission. Therefore, this paper presents a priced and social tie based power allocation scheme, which considers the double-faced nature of user to improve the power utilization and data transmission performance.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the D2D underlying cellular network, users are classified into two types: cooperative user and requester. The former gets the data from BS and forwards it to the latter, as shown in Fig. 1 . In our scenario, D2D users can forward data with low transmitting power by reusing the spectrum resource of cellular users. Assume that there are k requesters denoted as U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · u k }. Since the proposed model is closely associated with the social relationship between users, the physical and social domains are explained, respectively. 
A. PHYSICAL DOMAIN
Physical domain is the platform supporting D2D communications. D2D users reuse the resource of cellular users, which in turn incurs interference of D2D users. The physical domain is abstracted as a graph G(V p , E p ), where V p is the set of nodes, E p denotes the edge between devices or the link quality for data transmission. Accordingly, the physical domain exposes whether the devices meet the communication requirement with respect to the resource and physical location.
B. SOCIAL DOMAIN
Social domain is the set of social relationship and social attributes. Similarly, the social domain is abstracted as a directional weighted graph G(V s , E s , w), where V s denotes human users, corresponding to the mobile devices in the physical domain. E s is the social relationship between users, w is the strength of edge referred as S ij , and a larger S ij means a stronger cooperation willingness.
As the resource provider, a cooperative user is the leader during the data forwarding process, since the data forwarding will consume the power and buffer resource. In this paper, we focus on the power allocation with power constraint to maximize the benefit of cooperative user and multiple requesting users simultaneously. Considering the social selfishness of users, a price-based incentive mechanism is introduced, in which requesters have to pay for the allocated resource by the cooperative user with different prices. Furthermore, due to the heterogeneous social tie between different users, the price (per unit) paid by each requester is determined by the social tie with the cooperative user.
From the perspective of a requester, its incentive for obtaining the data from a cooperative user instead of BS is the rate enhancement and reduced waiting time. Therefore, the rate of cellular link and D2D link is explained, respectively. In the case of multiple D2D users reusing the same cellular resource, the D2D link rate is expressed as:
where P d is the transmitting power of a D2D user, corresponding to P k in Fig. 2 
the above related parameters are similar to that in equation (1), and define g Bd = ζ B,d −α |h 0 | 2 .
IV. SOCIAL-AWARE POWER ALLOCATION SCHEME BASED ON STACKELBERG GAME
According to Section 2, it is obvious that there is a power and energy consumption of a cooperative user in the case of data forwarding, resulting in the benefit loss of the cooperative user. Considering the social selfishness of users, a pricebased incentive mechanism is proposed to motivate the user to forward data cooperatively. In order to benefit the cooperative user during the cooperation process, requesters pay for the allocated power with a social tie-based price, which is greater than power cost for the cooperative user. Therefore, the cooperative user needs to design an appropriate power allocation scheme to maximize its own benefit, according to the power demand for data transmission. In view of the fact that social tie strength weakens the level of social selfishness, the normal price and special price are considered, respectively, and the latter is adjusted based on the former and social tie strength. Furthermore, the special price is inversely proportional to the social tie strength. That is to say, the cooperative user is willing to forward data for requester with a relatively low reward if a strong social tie strength exists between them, which reveals the double-faced nature of users. Aiming at the above issue, a Stackelberg game based power allocation scheme is proposed, which consists of two sides, namely the leader and the follower. The leader firstly provides a strategy, and then the follower gives its optimal strategy. Afterwards, the leader observes the optimal strategy of the follower and constantly adjusts its optimal strategy to ultimately reach a balance. In our scenario, as the power provider during the cooperation communication process, cooperative user and requester are the leader and follower, respectively. Therefore, the cooperative user firstly gives its price strategy, and requesters provide their strategies according to the power demand. Through negotiation and adjustment, the equilibrium is going to maximize the utility of both sides, as shown in Fig. 3 .
A. UTILITY MODEL
This subsection analyzes the benefit of the cooperative user and requesters, and constructs their utility function. For the requesters, the rate improvement is the motivation to get the requested data from the cooperative user instead of BS, while the rewarded payment is the benefit of the cooperative user. Hence, the utility function of requesters is defined as:
Accordingly, the utility function of the cooperative user is defined as:
where S ci is the social tie strength between the cooperative user and requester i, c and V are the cost and price of per unit power, respectively, and P i denotes the allocated power of requester i. Equations (3) and (4) reveal that the hard and soft incentives are jointly considered in this paper. In particular, when the social tie is relatively weak, the utility of cooperative user is improved by raising the power price. On the other hand, the cooperative user can sell its power resource with low price in the case of a strong social tie, sacrificing its own benefit to promote the benefit of the corresponding requester. In other words, the actual power price paid by requester i is (1 − S ci )V . Generally speaking, the power price is constrained in an interval to implement the pricing process according to the market rule. Furthermore, some certain QoS requirement should be satisfied to guarantee the successful data transmission [41] , hence, the minimum allocated power is constrained for each requester. Consequently, the utility function of the cooperative user is rewritten as:
where SIN R th is the threshold of SINR ensuring the basic data transmission. P max indicates the total power of the cooperative user, and V max is the maximum power price. Therefore, constraint (i) is to guarantee that the sum of allocated power of all requesters is not greater than the total available power of the cooperative user. Constraint (ii) is to restrict the power price in an interval, while constraint (iii) is to meet the QoS requirement for the basic data transmission. In reality, for the proposed power allocation scheme, there are two variables that need to determine, one is the normal price V , the other one is the allocated power for each requester P i .
B. PRICING SCHEME
This subsection models the power allocation problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the first stage, the cooperative user publishes the power price, and then the requesters respond the power resource demand in the second stage. All of the requesters want to be allocated the maximum power and pay the minimum price to the cooperative user by optimizing the power demand according to the power price offered by the cooperative user. Meanwhile, the cooperative user wants to maximize its utility by providing the optimal price to satisfy the demand of requesters while guarantees the contracts agreements, i.e., the minimum required power. Therefore, the benefit of these two sides is contradictory to some extent, and the equilibrium can be achieved through multiple adjustments until the two sides don't change their strategy any more.
Definition 1: (V * , P * ) is the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game if it satisfies the following conditions for any (V , P):
where P is the power allocation strategy, namely
For the proposed game in this paper, the equilibrium can be obtained as follows. The second stage problem is firstly solved to get the P * , which is used to solve the first stage problem to obtain the V * as the following expressed.
The first stage:
The second stage:
1) OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE SECOND STAGE
Here, we solve the problem of (8) with continuous feasible space. According to equation (3), we have the following lemma. Lemma 1: For given price V , the unique optimal solution for the second stage is:
where g ci = ζ c,i −α |h 0 | 2 . Proof: Firstly, define function:
Combined with (1) and (2), the equation (10) is rewritten as:
where P B and S ci can be known in advance. The first order derivative of objection function (11) is:
The second order derivative is:
Since (8) is convex. Therefore, the sub-game of requesters is a convex optimization problem. Let the first order derivative of requester utility function be equal to zero, then for given power price V , the optimal solution of the second stage problem is given by:
It can be observed that the optimal allocated power of requester is related to the social tie strength and power price. VOLUME 6, 2018
2) OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE FIRST STAGE
Based on the optimal solution of the second stage, the optimal solution for the first stage can be characterized accordingly. Substituting (14) into problem (5), the first stage problem can be reformulated as:
It is straightforward to show that problem (15) is a convex problem. The Lagrange function is formulated as:
where λ, µ, ν are Lagrange multipliers, and
Obviously, A and B are the upper bound and lower bound of price V , respectively. The dual problem is then given as:
where
The dual problem (19) can be solved using the sub-gradient method [42] , [43] , which updates the Lagrange multipliers as follows:
where κ t λ , κ t u , κ t v are positive step sizes, and [X ] + = max{X , 0}. Based on the KKT condition, the optimal price V that cooperative user offers to requester i can be obtained through ∂L ∂V = 0 as follows:
The specific power allocation scheme is described as Table 1 . Therefore, the optimal solution of the first stage is obtained through iteration. Furthermore, the Stackelberg equilibrium for the prosed game model is the point (V * , P * ) given by equation (9) and (23) .
V. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section simulates and analyzes the proposed power allocation scheme. In detail, the price variation and power as well as price constraints are analyzed, and the impact of some related parameters on the utility function is also simulated. The simulation parameters are set as Table 2 . In order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed power allocation scheme, other two power allocation schemes are compared as references. One is the scheme without consideration of social tie, the other is no incentive scheme. For the former, only the price is the factor to motivate the cooperation, while the latter assumes that the user is altruistic and takes no incentive mechanism to implement the power allocation. In this simulation, we consider P max = 8, and V max = 6. The normal user has no regard to the social relationship with the cooperative user, whereas the other four users' social tie strength is set as 0.46, 0.10, 0.73, and 0.65, respectively. It can be seen that the price converges in a limited iteration as 20. Moreover, the paid price of each requester is different, just due to the different social tie strength between cooperative user and requesters. According to the negative correlation between the paid price and social tie strength, it can be derived that the requester 3 has the strongest social tie with the cooperative user. It can be observed that the utility of cooperative user increases with the maximum price, while that of requesters decrease with it. This is because, with fixed total power, the power cost is also unchanged, so a higher upper bound of price may result in a higher paid price accordingly. Due to the benefit contradiction between cooperative user and requesters, the utility of requesters would be decreased with a higher paid price. Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of power constraint on the utility of the two sides in the game model with fixed price constraint. Obviously, the utility of requesters increases with the available total power. On the contrast, the utility of the cooperative user shows a downtrend with the increase of total power. The reason is that with a fixed maximum price, the reward of the cooperative user is constrained accordingly. Consequently, the increased total power means a higher resource cost, resulting in a reduced utility of the cooperative user. For the requester, the increased available power means a strengthened rate enhancement, so that the utility of requesters is improved. 7 compares the system capacity under different power allocation schemes. The figure exposes that the proposed power allocation scheme achieves the highest system capacity for any P max . This is because the proposed scheme considers FIGURE 7. Comparison of system capacity under power constraints. VOLUME 6, 2018 the selfishness of a cooperative user, meanwhile, the social tie is also involved to establish the dual incentive mechanism. However, for the scheme that ignores the social tie between users or without incentive mechanism, the cooperation willingness of user is relatively weak, leading to a lower link reliability and higher packet loss probability, so as to decrease the system capacity. Fig. 8 betrays the impact of D2D communication range on the system capacity under different power allocation schemes. According to the line trend, it is clear that the system capacity decreases along with the growing D2D communication range, and the proposed scheme has a superior performance in terms of system capacity. This is because the proposed scheme can effectively enhance the cooperation willingness of the cooperative user to contribute the power resource and reduce the forwarding delay, so as to improve the transmission efficiency. Therefore, with the increase of D2D communication range, the link quality of the proposed scheme is better than that of the other two schemes. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Aiming at the social selfishness of user, this paper has proposed a social-aware power allocation scheme with dual incentive mechanism in the D2D cooperation environment. In particular, since the rate enhancement and price reward are pursued by the cooperative user and requesting users, respectively, the utility of these two sides is formulated accordingly. Furthermore, considering the benefit contradiction between these two sides, a two-stage Stackelberg game model has been introduced, so that the final power price and power allocation strategy are determined via continuous adjustment while jointly maximizing the utility of cooperative user and requesting users. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can effectively motive the user to forward data and improve the transmission performance. PORUI ZHANG received the B.Sc. degree from the Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing, China, in 2015, where he is currently pursuing the master's degree in information and communication engineering. His research interests include mobile social networks and machine learning. VOLUME 6, 2018 
